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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY FOR INS 
CHURCH-BUSTERS? 
PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (U.S.A.) v. 
UNITED STATES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In The Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. United States,! the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court holding that the doctrine 
of "qualified immunity"2 protected individual agents of the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service (INS) from damages 
claims for constitutional violations.8 The plaintiff churches· had 
sued the agents for damages and sought to enjoin the govern-
1. 870 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1989) (per Norris, J; the other panel members were Kozin-
ski, J., and Leavy, J.). 
2. The concept of qualified immunity, also known by its older name of "good faith 
immunity", shields from civil damages liability those government officials who perform 
discretionary functions, as long as "their conduct does not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (President Nixon's aides qualifiedly im-
mune from damages suit by discharged Air Force employee). The Supreme Court re-
cently refined the concept by stating: "The contours of the right must be sufficiently 
clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that 
right. This is not to say that an official is protected by qualified immunity unless the 
very action in question has previously been held unlawful, ... but it is to say that in the 
light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent." Presbyterian Church, 870 
F.2d at 527 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (FBI agent who 
searched home in violation of fourth amendment qualifiedly immune from damages suit 
if he could reasonably have believed search was legal)). 
3. Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 528. 
4. Three of the plaintiffs were in Phoenix: Alzona Evangelical Lutheran Church, 
Camelback United Presbyterian Church and Sunrise United Presbyterian Church. The 
fourth plaintiff, Southside United Presbyterian Church, was located in Tucson. The two 
national parent denominations, The Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) and the American Lu-
theran Church, were also plaintiffs. Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 520. 
97 
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ment entities from covert surveillance of church activities,ci 
claiming that the surveillance violated the churches' first and 
fourth amendment rights.8 Because of its dismissal of the dam-
ages claims against the agents,7 the court remanded for a deter-
mination as to whether standing and mootness obstacles might 
compel dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims for equitable relief 
against the defendant government entities.8 This note will focus 
on the court's holding that the individual agents are qualifiedly 
immune from damages suits based on the churches' claim that 
their right to the free exercise of religion under the first amend-
ment was violated.9 
II. FACTS 
Between March 1984 and January 1985, the INS conducted 
a covert surveillance program aimed at four Arizona churches10 
whose members and leaders allegedly were participants in the 
so-called "sanctuary movement".l1 The surveillance at issue in 
Presbyterian Church involved sending INS agents into 
churches.12 The agents infiltrated church activities posing as or-
dinary citizens, and surreptitiously made tape recordings of nu-
merous church services and Bible study classes.13 The investiga-
tions were conducted without search warrants and without 
probable cause to believe that the surveillance of the churches 
would uncover evidence of criminal activity.14 The surveillance 
became a matter of public record during the prosecution of sev-
eral members of the movement. lIi Subsequently, the churches 
5. [d. at 521. 
6. [d. 
7. Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 528. 
8. [d. at 529. 
9. Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 521. 
10. The Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. United States, 870 F.2d 518, 520. See 
supra note 4. 
11. Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 520. The movement was a widespread group 
of clergy and lay people who provided assistance and shelter in private homes and reli-
gious buildings to Central American refugees who had entered the country illegally. See 
generally 1. BAU. THIS GROUND IS HOLY 75-76 (1985) (hereinafter BAU). 
12. Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 520. See also United States v. Aguilar, 871 
F.2d 1436, 1470 (9th Cir. 1989) (criminal prosecution of sanctuary workers, during which 
proceedings INS revealed it had placed informants among sanctuary workers). 
13. Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 520. 
14. [d. 
15. [d. 
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brought this suit.16 
In the district court, the churches alleged that defendants 
abridged their first amendment rights of free exercise of religion, 
free speech and free association.17 In addition, they alleged that 
the warrantless surveillance constituted an illegal search under 
the fourth amendment.1s Finally, the churches alleged that when 
their congregations learned of the surveillance, the churches suf-
fered actual injuries.19 
The churches sought nominal damages against the individ-
ual INS agents,20 a declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief 
prohibiting the INS from engaging in such surveillance in the 
future, absent a "prior established and compelling governmental 
interest."21 The district court ruled that the churches lacked 
first amendment standing,22 that they had failed to state a 
fourth amendment claim,23 that the individual agents were enti-
tled to qualified immunity from suit on the damages claim,24 and 
that the government entities were protected by sovereign immu-
nity against the claims for equitable and monetary relief.211 
16. Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 520. 
17. [d. On appeal, the sole first amendment issue was apparently the free exercise 
claim. The court limited its discussion to that claim, and made no further mention of the 
"freedom of belief, speech and association" claims. [d. at 520-527. 
18. [d. at 521. 
19. [d. at 521-22. The injuries included: withdrawal of church members from active 
participation; cancellation of a Bible study group for lack of participation; diversion of 
clergy time from regular pastoral duties; decline in monetary support by the membership 
and the community; reluctance by congregants to seek pastoral counseling; and less 
openness among the congregants in prayers and confessions. [d. 
20. [d. 
21. Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 521-22. 
22. [d. The district court reasoned that the first amendment protects only individu-
als, not corporations, because "churches don't go to heaven." Quoted in Presbyterian 
Church, 870 F.2d at 521. 
23. [d. 
24. [d. 
25. [d. at 524-25. The common law governmental defense of sovereign immunity is 
codified in the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982). This section waives 
the defense (under certain circumstances) against equitable relief, but not against law-
suits for money damages. The district court agreed with the INS that the agency's inves-
tigation of the churches was not an "agency action" within the meaning of section 702, 
but the Ninth Circuit reversed on this point. Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 524-25. 
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III. BACKGROUND 
A. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 
The purpose of the doctrine of qualified immunity, as ar-
ticulated by the Supreme Court in Harlow v. Fitzgerald28 is to 
shield innocent public officials from insubstantial lawsuits.27 
Qualified immunity analysis focuses on whether a reasonable 
government official should have known that his or her actions 
were violative of a person's constitutional or statutory rights.28 
The reasonableness of the official's actions depends on how 
"clearly established" those rights are.2S 
The Supreme Court in Anderson v. Creighton30 described 
the analysis in more detail. The Court first observed that under 
Harlow, whether an official should be held qualifiedly immune 
for an allegedly unlawful action "turns on the 'objective legal 
reasonableness' of the action ... assessed in light of the legal 
rules that were 'clearly established' at the time it was taken."31 
The Court noted that the operation of this standard depends 
substantially upon the "level of generality" at which the relevant 
"legal rule" is to be identified.32 For example, the Court noted 
that there are many constitutional and statutory rights which 
can be said to be "clearly established" in the general sense, such 
[d. 
26. 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982). 
27. [d. The Court explained the purpose as follows: 
In situations of abuse of office, an action for damages may 
offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional 
guarantees. [citations omitted]. It is this recognition that has 
required the denial of absolute immunity to most public of-
ficers. At the same time, however, it cannot be disputed seri-
ously that claims frequently run against the innocent as well 
as the guilty-at a cost not only to the defendant officials, but 
to society as a whole. [footnote omitted]. 
In identifying qualified immunity as the best attainable 
accommodation of competing values ... we relied on the as-
sumption that this standard would permit "[i]nsubstantial 
lawsuits [to] be quickly terminated." 
28. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. 
29. [d. 
30. 483 U.S. 635 (1987). 
31. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639, quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19. 
32. Anderson. 483 U.S. at 639. 
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as the fourteenth amendment right to due process of law,33 and 
the fourth amendment right to be secure against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.34 But in order to overcome the defense of 
qualified immunity, plaintiffs must do more than merely allege 
violations of such "extremely abstract rights."36 
In Anderson, an FBI agent without a warrant had searched 
a house, erroneously believing that the search was supported by 
probable cause and exigent circumstances.36 The plaintiffs ar-
gued that the agent was not entitled to qualified immunity, be-
cause the fugitive who was the object of the search was not pre-
sent at the house, making the search therefore "unreasonable" 
and a violation of the fourth amendment.37 The Court rejected 
this argument, pointing out that plaintiffs were in essence as-
serting that an agent's ultimately erroneous search could not be 
"reasonably unreasonable" for qualified immunity purposes.38 
The Court observed that the plaintiffs' position would create a 
"rule of virtually unqualified liability."39 The Court remanded 
the case to the district court for a determination of whether the 
actions allegedly taken by the FBI agent were actions that a rea-
sonable officer could have believed lawful; that is, whether it was 
reasonable for him to believe he had probable cause and exigent 
circumstances to search the house.4o 
The Supreme Court has consistently held that the defense 
of qualified immunity is to be decided at the earliest possible 
stage in the litigation.41 The "earliest possible stage" is not nec-
essarily at the summary judgment stage; it may be later, as the 
Court in Anderson observed.42 A defense of qualified immunity 
can even be presented and resolved at the end of atrial. 43 An 
33.Id. 
34. Id. at 640. 
35. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639. 
36. Id. at 637. 
37. Id. at 643. 
38. Id. at 643. 
39. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639. 
40. Id. at 646 n. 6; 640·41. 
41. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818; Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (U.S. 
Attorney General entitled to qualified immunity from suit over wiretaps which violated 
fourth amendment, since illegality was not clearly established as of time of wiretaps); 
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 646 n.6. 
42. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 646 n.6. 
43. See, e.g., Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 274·75 (7th Cir.) (state official's fail· 
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important reason for denying a defendant qualified immunity at 
the summary judgment stage is the necessity for resolution of 
material factual issues bearing on the question of the reasona-
bleness of a defendant official's actions." 
The Supreme Court has not definitively prescribed the 
source of law from which a court is to determine whether a right 
is clearly established. In Harlow, the Supreme Court declined 
for the second timeU to decide whether the clearly-established 
nature of'a particular right should be evaluated solely by refer-
ence to the opinions of the Supreme Court, or should also refer 
to the appellate and district courts.'s At least one pre-Harlow 
case'7 held that the inquiry was to include Supreme Court opin-
ure to move for directed verdict at close of all evidence did not foreclose inclusion of 
qualified immunity defense in motion for JNOV), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848 (1986). 
44. See, e.g., Anderson, 483 U.S. at 646 n.6. See also Roth v. Veteran's Administra-
tion, 856 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1988). In Roth, a "whistleblower" physician's first amend-
ment claim against Veteran's Administration officials was found to involve a material 
factual dispute as to the extent of office disruption caused by the physician's 
whistleblowing activities. [d. at 1408. The defendant government officials nonetheless ar-
gued that they should be granted summary judgment based on qualified immunity. [d. 
The court summarized their argument as follows: 
[d. 
They contend that because we must balance competing inter-
ests in deciding whether office disruption outweighs protected 
speech, and because this balancing process is fact-specific, 
public officials cannot be expected to predict the outcome of 
such balancing or engage in it themselves. 
The court in Roth conceded that the Seventh Circuit in Benson, 786 F.2d at 276, 
adopted this position. But the court in Roth rejected this logic as inapposite at the sum-
mary judgment stage, observing that the qualified immunity defense in Benson had been 
presented after full development of the relevant facts at a trial. Roth, 856 F.2d at 1408. 
The court instead held that the need to conduct such fact-based balancing precluded a 
grant of summary judgment based on qualified immunity. [d. 
45. [d. at 818 n.32. The first time the Court declined to define what "clearly estab-
lished" means was in Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 565 (1978) (state prison offi-
cials held qualifiedly immune from suit over alleged negligent interference with pris-
oner's outgoing mail). 
46. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 n.32. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals twice referred, 
in 1983 and 1984, to this lack of Supreme Court guidance. See Hobson v. Wilson, 737 
F.2d 1, 25-26 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (police and FBI agents not qualifiedly immune from dam-
ages for violating peace groups' first amendment rights, despite no Supreme Court hold-
ing on particular facts of this case); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 720 F.2d 162, 168-69 (D.C. Cir. 
1983) (former U.S. Attorney General qualifiedly immune from damages suit, as there 
existed no clearly established warrant requirement for national security wiretaps). 
47. Wallace v. King, 626 F.2d 1157 (4th Cir. 1980) (police officers who conducted 
illegal search in good faith reliance on department policies not liable for damages be-
cause no clearly established law existed), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 969 (1981). 
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ions, those of the "appropriate" court of appeals,48 and the high-
est state court.49 
The Ninth Circuit in Bilbrey v. Brown50 defined the doc-
trine as involving more than merely looking for a binding prece-
dent from the U.S. Supreme Court.51 In Capoeman v. Reed,52 
the court expanded the scope of inquiry into the question of 
whether a law is clearly established. 58 The court observed that in 
the absence of binding precedent, a court should look to 
"whatever decisional law is available" to ascertain whether the 
law is clearly established. 54 The court in Capoeman expressly 
noted that inquiry was broader than merely looking at decisions 
of the Supreme Court, the state's highest court and the "appro-
priate" circuit court. 55 That court also reviewed decisions of 
lower state courts, other circuits, and district courts. 56 
The Capoeman principles were applied by the Ninth Circuit 
in subsequent decisions. 57 This trend has continued, with the 
most recent Ninth Circuit decisions surveying every circuit to 
find opinions that shed light on the clearly established nature of 
the right allegedly violated. &8 
48. [d at 1161. 
49. [d. 
50. 738 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1984) (students had clearly-established fourth amend-
ment rights to be free from unreasonable searches by school officials). 
51. [d. at 1466. In Bilbrey, the court, finding no explicit rulings by the Supreme 
Court or the Ninth Circuit, found that the officials had constructive notice of decisions of 
state courts, other circuits and various district courts. [d. 
52. 754 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1985) (prison officials immune from liability for cutting 
prisoner's hair allegedly in violation of first amendment free exercise rights). 
53. [d. at 1514. 
54. [d. 
55. [d. The court noted that it was adopting a broader inquiry than that employed 
by the Fourth Circuit in Wallace, which did not consider the opinions of other circuits or 
of district courts. Wallace, 626 F.2d at 1161. 
56. Capoeman, 754 F.2d at 1514. 
57. See, e.g., Vaughan v. Ricketts, 859 F.2d 736, 739 (9th Cir. 1988) (prison official 
on notice that manner of digital rectal searches was unconstitutional); Wood v. Os-
trander, 851 F.2d 1212, 1217 (9th Cir. 1988) (law clearly established that state trooper 
could not abandon passenger of impounded car in high-crime neighborhood); Ward v. 
County of San Diego, 791 F.2d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1986) (sheriff on notice of clearly 
established law that pre-hearing jail detainees cannot be strip searched absent probable 
cause, despite contrary state superior court opinion), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1020 (1987). 
58. See Vaughan, 859 F.2d at 739. The court surveyed the law on "reasonable" strip 
searches in all circuits, noting that by 1984 (the year plaintiff was strip searched) the 
majority of the circuits had considered the question. The court specifically found that, in 
addition to the Supreme Court, eight circuits had dealt with the issue. [d. 
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The Capoeman opinion also employed a specific procedure 
for determining whether defendant government officials could be 
charged with constructive knowledge of the law in a particular 
area, even though there were few Ninth Circuit cases involving 
the same factual scenario. The court in Capoeman concluded 
that when there are relatively few cases on point, and none of 
them are binding, courts in this circuit may determine whether 
the Supreme Court or the Ninth Circuit would have reached the 
same conclusion as those other courts. liB That determination 
consists of evaluating the way those non-binding decisions ap-
plied related legal issues to factually different situations, and 
comparing those legal applications to the analyses being used by 
the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit at the same time.60 To 
make its determination of how clearly established the law was, 
the court in Capoeman examined how other circuit and district 
courts analyzed prisoners' allegations of first amendment free 
exercise violations by prison regulations.61 Not only did the 
court consider cases involving prison hair-length regulations (the 
situation in Capoeman), but it also examined a variety of other 
religious freedom issues in prisons.62 The court concluded that, 
while a variety of standards were employed by courts, most of 
the non-binding decisions applied the "less restrictive means" 
test to those alleged first amendment violations.63 
The court then compared the non-binding decisions to the 
analyses used in cases before the Ninth Circuit6• and the Su-
preme Court,611 neither of which was factually identical to the 
See also, Lum v. Jensen, 876 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1989) (supervisors of civil service em-
ployee immune from suit because of conflict in other circuits' opinions and lack of prece-
dent in Ninth Circuit). In Lum, the court devoted three pages of its opinion to a survey 
of the decisional law. The court carefully considered the holdings, analyses and facts in 
cases from eleven circuits and the Supreme Court. Id at 1387-89. 
59. [d. Examples of non-binding decisions would be those of other circuits, state 
courts, and those of another federal district. [d. at 1414. 
60. [d. Accord Ward v. County of San Diego, 791 F.2d at 1332; Lum v. Jensen, 876 
F.2d at 1387. 
61. Capoeman, 754 F.2d at 1515. 
62. [d. Some examples are: beards worn by prisoners of various faiths; name 
changes; body searches of male prisoners by female guards; use of the prison chapel by 
prisoners of non-mainstream faiths. [d. 
63. [d. 
64. Jones v. Bradley, 590 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1979) (prison had legitimate reasons for 
restrictions on chapel use). 
65. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (Buddhist prisoner entitled to reasonable op-
portunity to pursue faith comparable to that of prisoners of conventional faiths). 
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situation involved in Capoeman.66 The court found that prior to 
the time the plaintiff's hair was cut pursuant to the prison regu-
lations, it was not clear which standard the Ninth Circuit would 
have used to evaluate prison regulations.67 Prison officials might 
have reasonably believed that their hair-length regulation was 
an "appropriate restriction", or that it needed only a "rational 
basis", or that prison officials needed only to balance a "legiti-
mate interest" in prison security against prisoners' constitu-
tional rights in order to promulgate such a regulation.68 Because 
of the welter of conflicting standards and tests employed to eval-
uate alleged violations of prisoners' first amendment rights, and 
in the absence of a clear indication that the Ninth Circuit or the 
Supreme Court would have adopted the "less restrictive means" 
standard employed by the majority of other circuits, the court in 
Capoeman found that the law was not clearly established in this 
circuit.69 Therefore, prison officials were entitled to qualified im-
munity, because they could not be charged with the knowledge 
that they had to make a prior determination that cutting prison-
ers' hair was the least restrictive means of accomplishing the 
prison's interests.7o 
A more recent Ninth Circuit application of the Capoeman 
procedure was seen in Wood v. Ostrander.71 The question in Os-
trander was whether a person who suffered harm as a result of 
being placed in danger by a police officer in the course of his 
official duty could prevail over a qualified immunity defense.72 
The court acknowledged that it had not found a binding prece-
dent from either the Supreme Court or the Ninth Circuit.73 The 
66. Capoeman, 754 F.2d at 1514-15. 
67. [d. 
68. [d. at 1515. 
69. Capoeman, 754 F.2d at 1515-16. 
70. [d. at 1516. 
71. 851 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1988). The plaintiff in Ostrander sought damages under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a state trooper for allegedly leaving a woman alone in a high-
crime area aft~r impounding her car in the middle of the night. [d. at 1213. The trooper 
had pulled the car over at 2:30 a.m. because its high beams were on. Determining that 
the driver was drunk, the officer arrested him and called for a tow truck to have the car 
impounded. [d. The woman passenger claimed she was not offered a ride home or any 
other help in leaving the high-crime area. After walking some distance in 50-degree 
weather wearing only a blouse and jeans, she accepted a ride with an unknown man, who 
then drove her to a secluded area and raped her. [d. 
72. [d. at 1218. 
73. [d. at 1218. 
9
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court observed that the law for the Seventh Circuit was clearly 
established by the holding in White v. Rochford,7' but whether 
that case established the law for the Ninth Circuit was a close 
question.7 !! In order to answer that question, the court in Os-
trander recalled76 the procedure applied in Capoeman.77 
The opinion in Ostrander analyzed a 1986 Ninth Circuit 
case, Escamilla v. Santa Ana,78 observing that the court there 
had relied primarily on pre-1984 cases.79 In Escamilla, a by-
stander was unintentionally killed by brawlers in a barroom. 
The bystander's children sued the undercover officer present, on 
the theory that he had negligently failed to prevent the killing.80 
The court concluded that those facts gave rise to no liability, 
because the law imposed no duty to protect the bystander ab-
sent a "special relationship" between the bystander and the po-
lice officer.81 
The Ostrander opinion then reviewed the analysis of Es-
camilla in light of the analysis in Rochford,82 observing that 
both the Ninth Circuit and the Seventh Circuit required a spe-
cial relationship to exist between a police officer and a bystander 
before liability could arise.83 The court reasoned that although 
the conclusion in Escamilla was not binding (because of the 
finding of no special relationship), the declaration of the appli-
cable legal rule for the Ninth Circuit was binding." The connec-
tion of this legal rule with the sufficiently on-point fact pattern 
in Rochford required that the defendant officer in Ostrander be 
charged with constructive knowledge that the presence of his 
74. 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979) (police liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for recklessly 
endangering three young children stranded in a car on a busy eight-lane freeway upon 
the arrest of their uncle for drag-racing the car). 
75. Ostrander, 851 F.2d at 1218. 
76. [d. 
77. 754 F.2d at 1515. 
78. 796 F.2d 266 (9th Cir. 1986) (police officer not liable for bystander's death in 
barroom brawl because no custodial or other special relationship existed). 
79. Ostrander, 851 F.2d at 1218 (citing Escamilla, 796 F.2d at 268-9). The Es-
camilla opinion's reliance on pre-1984 cases was significant to the court in Ostrander 
because the cases predated the events in Ostrander. Ostrander, 851 F.2d at 1218. 
80. Escamilla, 796 F.2d at 267. 
81. [d. at 270. 
82. Ostrander, 851 F.2d at 1218-19. 
83. [d. 
84. [d. at 1218. 
10
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special relationship to the woman he abandoned would give rise 
to liability.81i Therefore, the defendant was not entitled to a 
qualified immunity defense.8s 
The case being decided need not be factually identical to a 
prior case in order for a court to conclude that the prior case 
clearly establishes the law.87 To require strict factual similarity 
would operate to perpetually immunize government actors from 
suit.88 The Supreme Court has cautioned courts not to take a 
too-restrictive view of the factual similarities necessary to find 
that a right is clearly established.89 The Ninth Circuit has 
adopted this reasoning,90 rejecting arguments that a "case can be 
disposed of if it does not bear a strict factual similarity to previ-
ous cases finding liability."91 Such an argument is a "crabbed 
view of the good faith immunity principle [which] cannot with-
stand analysis. "92 
85. Ostrander, 851 F.2d at 1218. 
86. [d. at 1220. 
87. Ostrander, 851 F.2d at 1217. The court found that" the key similarities between 
the case at bar and the prior case were: the level of danger to which the plaintiffs were 
exposed, id.; the officer's deliberate indifference to that danger, id. at 1217-18; and the 
fact that the endangerment was the result of the performance of official duty, id. at 1218. 
The factual dissimilarities, such as the differences in age, location and the potential 
harm, did not entitle the defendant to immunity. [d. The court observed: "It defies com-
mon sense to find a meaningful legal distinction between the dangers facing children 
crossing a busy highway and a woman left alone to fend for herself at 2:30 a.m. in a high-
crime area." [d. 
88. Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The Court in Hobson put it this 
way: 
In such circumstances, to require a prior Supreme Court hold-
ing on the particular facts of this case would not only immu-
nize but actually reward the Government for inventing and 
pursuing ever more egregious conduct. Indeed, there never 
could be such a ruling from the Court, because Harlow would 
always immunize the Government actors. 
[d. at 29 (emphasis added). 
89. See Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 535 n. 12; see also Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. The 
Supreme Court in Anderson rejected the need for strict factual similarity, observing that 
officials are not always immune from liability or suit merely because the challenged ac-
tion was not held previously, under identical circumstances, to have been unconstitu-
tional. [d. 
90. Ostrander, 851 F.2d at 1217. The court specifically relied on the Supreme 
Court's reasoning in Anderson and Forsyth for the analysis of the degree of factual simi-
larity needed to overcome qualified immunity. [d. 
91. [d. The court was referring to the defendants' arguments, which were relied on 
by the district court. [d. at 1216, nA. 
92. [d at 1217. 
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The Ninth Circuit has continued to hold that strict factual 
similarity is not required, and has distinguished cases holding 
otherwise in other circuits. For example, in Benson v. Allphin,93 
the Seventh Circuit expressed its uncertainty as to the precise 
manner of determining whether the law was clearly established. 
There, a state employee claimed that his first amendment right 
to speak out publicly on issues of public concern outweighed his 
supervisor's right to take measures to shield from public disclos-
ure an internal investigation of illegal activities by state employ-
ees. 9~ The Seventh Circuit noted that a fact-specific balancing 
was required to, among other things, determine the extent to 
which the supervisor's ability to effectively conduct his investi-
gation was being undermined by the employee's whistle blowing 
disclosures.9G The court observed that the proper balancing of 
those factors was a complicated and difficult task even for the 
judiciary, and even more so for the defendant public official,96 
For that reason, the court reasoned that the facts of the existing 
caselaw must closely correspond to the contested action before 
the defendant official's qualified immunity defense would be 
rejected.97 
Defendants in a Ninth Circuit case, Roth v. Veteran's Ad-
ministration,98 attempted to make the same argument in an-
other whistle blowing case. The court distinguished Benson on 
two grounds. First, the court observed that there are situations 
in which the defendants' conduct may be so egregious that par-
ticularized balancing of protected first amendment rights against 
the need to minimize office disruption will be a foregone conclu-
sion in favor of the plaintiffs, and qualified immunity should be 
unavailable to the defendants.99 The court rejected the defend-
ants' reliance on Benson, observing that acceptance of a broader 
reading of Benson would amount to a holding that public em-
ployees can never bring an action alleging retaliation for exercise 
of first amendment rights because adjudicating these claims re-
, 
93. 786 F.2d 268 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848 (1986). 
94. [d. at 271. The specific measures challenged by the employee included his termi-
nation by his supervisor. [d. 
95. [d. at 276. 
96. [d. at 278. 
97. Benson, 786 F.2d at 276. 
98. 856 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1988). 
99. Roth, 856 F.2d at 1408, citing Benson, 786 F.2d at 276 n. 18. 
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quires particularized balancing. 100 
The court in Roth also distinguished Benson on the ground 
that the finding of qualified immunity in Benson came after a 
full tria1.10l The court reasoned that in such a case, there was a 
much more fully developed examination of the facts, which 
could then be accurately compared to the prior caselaw.l02 The 
court therefore declined to find the defendants qualifiedly im-
mune at the summary judgment stage, observing that precisely 
because a fact-specific, particularized balancing was required, 
there would necessarily be genuine issues of material fact 
preventing the grant of summary judgment. loa 
B. RELATED IMMIGRATION LITIGATION 
Presbyterian Church arose out of a criminal prosecution of 
several individuals involved in the sanctuary movement. 1M Eight 
of the convicted defendants appealed the case, United States v. 
Aguilar/or. to the Ninth Circuit. In Aguilar, the court noted that 
the three primary infiltrators lOS of the sanctuary movement in 
the Phoenix/Tucson region had taken part in a number of 
church-sponsored illegal activities such as smuggling opera-
tions/07 delivery of falsified immigration documents/os and in-
terstate transportation of illegal aliens.loe After securing the 
100. Roth, 856 F.2d at 1408. 
101. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
102. [d. 
103. [d. 
104. Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 520. See also supra notes 11-16 and accom-
panying text. 
105. 871 F.2d 1436 (9th Cir. 1989). The court set forth the criminal charges against 
the eight appellants in a footnote. [d. at 1441 n.1. 
106. The men, Jesus Cruz, John Nixon, and Soloman Graham, were informants for 
the INS. [d. at 1443-44. See also BAU, supra note 11, at 85. Two of the Aguilar infor-
mants, Jesus Cruz and Soloman Graham, were formerly smugglers employed by Ameri-
can ranchers to transport illegal aliens across the U.S. border. [d. at 85-86. They were 
specifically recruited by the INS in Phoenix to infiltrate the sanctuary movement as an 
alternative to criminal prosecution. BAU, supra note 11, at 86. 
107. Aguilar, 871 F.2d at 1443. The court observed that the infiltrators had repeat-
edly taken part in smuggling illegal aliens through an existing hole in the fence constitut-
ing the international boundary. [d. 
108. [d. One of the informants assisted several defendants obtain and deliver an 
immigration document to an illegal alien. Aguilar, 871 F.2d at 1443. 
109. [d. at 1443-44. After the illegal aliens had crossed the border, some were trans-
ported to various locations such as New Mexico and California. [d. 
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trust of the movement activists, llO the three informants at-
tended high-level secret meetings in the office of the Southside 
Church. 111 
The factual situation in Aguilar illustrates an INS infiltra-
tion program involving a type of surveillance distinct from that 
at issue in Presbyterian Church. The criminal defendants in 
Aguilar were the focus of fairly prosaic undercover criminal in-
vestigative techniques ll2 based on probable cause that crimes 
were being committed.ll3 The civil plaintiffs in Presbyterian 
Church, on the other hand, were the focus of surreptitious re-
cording of worship services and Bible study classesll4 by INS 
agentsllli who had no warrants or probable cause to believe 
crimes were being committed. ll8 
In both cases there arose the question of whether, in light of 
the implication of first amendment rights, the fourth amend-
ment required the government to obtain a warrant in order to 
conduct covert surveillance.l17 The Aguilar court rejected the ar-
gument, also made to the court in Presbyterian Church, that the 
mere presence of first amendment interests invokes the warrant 
clause of the fourth amendment.u8 The court held that the 
110. Id. at 1444-45. 
111. Id. See also BAU, supra note 11, at 85-86. The informants recorded over one 
hundred hours of conversations at these meetings. The recordings were transcribed into 
40,000 pages of transcript evidence. Id. 
112. Aguilar, 871 F.2d at 1443-45. 
113. [d. at 1442. The court described one 80urce of this probable cause: "Appellants 
sought and received extensive media coverage of their efforts on behalf of Central Ameri-
can aliens. Eventually, the INS accepted appellants' challenge to investigate their alien 
smuggling and harboring activities." The court then provided a detailed account of the 
great diversity of movement-initiated media coverage. [d. 
114. The Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. United States, 870 F.2d 518 (9th Circ. 
1989). 
115. [d. The court in Presbyterian Church did not name the informants. 
116. Id. See also supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text. 
117. Aguilar, 871 F.2d at 1472-73; Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 527. The prin-
cipal case relied on in each opinion was Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) 
(in police search of newspaper office for photographic evidence of a crime, fourth amend-
ment warrant requirement sufficient to protect first amendment rights of newspaper, 
such that higher protection of subpoena duces tecum not required). Zurcher held that 
the warrant requirement must be applied "with particular exactitude" when first amend-
ment rights might be violated. [d. at 565. 
118. See Aguilar, 871 F.2d at 1472 n. 36. The court approved of the holding in Pres-
byterian Church, 870 F.2d at 527, that Zurcher was inapposite, but not for exactly the 
same reason. The court in Presbyterian Church distinguished Zurcher on its facts. The 
court observed that a newspaper office was not generally open to the public, while a 
14
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fourth amendment's other protections are sufficient to safeguard 
first amendment rights in the context of an investigation of sus-
pected criminal activity.l19 
Another civil case arising out of criminal prosecution of 
sanctuary movement workers is American Baptist Churches in 
the U.S.A. v. Meese120 (hereinafter American Baptist Churches 
II). The plaintiff churches asserted a first amendment free exer-
cise right to harbor Central American refugees as a matter of 
religious faith. 121 The government prosecuted them under the 
same criminal harboring and transporting statute at issue in 
Aguilar.122 The plaintiffs in American Baptist Churches II un-
church worship service was. Therefore, the plaintiff churches had no reasonable expecta· 
tion of privacy. Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 527. 
The court in Aguilar, however, went further, and noted that even though Zurcher 
required a warrant to conduct a search when there were first amendment rights involved, 
the "invited informer" doctrine obviated the fourth amendment's warrant requirement. 
Aguilar, 871 F.2d at 1473. The court's implied rationale for this conclusion is apparently 
that reasonable law enforcement officials could suspect that criminal activities were tak-
ing place even in the worship services themselves. Id. at 1472 n. 37. 
In Presbyterian Church, the court did not (and could not) rely on this rationale. 
The court acknowledged that the INS had no probable cause to suspect that criminal 
activities were taking place in the worship services themselves. 870 F.2d at 520. There-
fore, the "invited informer" rationale was not available to the court in Presbyterian 
Church. 
119. Aguilar, 871 F.2d at 1471-73. The court observed that there are numerous cases 
holding that the fourth amendment does not protect from the "invited informer" the 
privacy rights of individuals suspected of being involved in criminal activities, because 
"legitimate law enforcement interests require persons to take the risk that those with 
whom they associate may be government agents." Id. at 1472. 
The opinion seemed to extend the "invited informer" doctrine significantly when it 
apparently approved of the covert surveillance of the worship services themselves. The 
court noted approvingly that the agents did not "actively disrupt" the worship activities, 
and that "[t]heir monitoring was surreptitious .... " Id. at 1472 n.37. Nowhere in the 
facts of Aguilar was there any discussion of the grounds for suspicion that illegal activi-
ties were taking place in the worship services. Rather, the facts all centered on the illegal 
planning going on in the private meetings held by the sanctuary movement workers. Id. 
at 1441-45. 
120. 712 F. Supp. 756 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (religious sanctuary workers unsuccessfully 
sought injunction against prosecution for smuggling and harboring Central American ref-
ugees). Also relevant to this discussion are earlier proceedings, which culminated in a 
reported decision. See American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A. v. Meese, 666 F. Supp. 
1358 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (plaintiffs had conditional standing to assert first amendment 
claim). 
121. American Baptist Churches II, 712 F. Supp. at 759. 
122. Id. The statute is the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, PUB.L. No. 
99-603, § 112, 100 STAT. 3381 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (1989)). The rele-
vant portions of that section concern, in essence, illegally bringing aliens into the coun-
try, transporting them within the country, and harboring them from detection. See also 
15
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successfully challenged the very prosecution itself,123 as a viola-
tion of their first amendment free exercise right to provide sanc-
tuary to refugees. 
The court in an earlier proceeding (hereinafter American 
Baptist Churches 1),124 held that the plaintiff religious organiza-
tions had standing to assert the first amendment claim.l2Ii In ad-
dition, the court held that they had stated a valid first amend-
ment cause of action,126 for either of two reasons. First, the 
plaintiffs may have been able to prove at trial that they were 
entitled to an exemption from the INS' enforcement of the ap-
plicable statute.127 Or second, they may have been able to prove 
that the government had prosecuted religious sanctuary workers 
in bad faith for th~ sole purpose of harassing them.128 
The court in American Baptist Churches [129 set forth the 
test used by the Ninth Circuit for analyzing alleged government 
intrusions on first amendment free exercise rights. ISO The court 
found that the plaintiffs had alleged the first prong of the test: 
Aguilar, 871 F.2d at 1446 n.2. 
123. American Baptist Churches II, 712 F. Supp. at 759. 
124. 666 F. Supp. 1358 (N.D. Cal. 1987). 
125. Id. at 1364. The court found a strong likelihood that the INS would continue to 
prosecute sanctuary workers in the future. Id. at 1362. The court based its conclusion on 
the history of the INS' prosecution of sanctuary workers (21 cases prosecuted so far, 
many of which involved the same religious organizations before the court), as well as the 
INS's declared intention of enforcing the statute. Id. 
126. Id. at 1366. 
127. Id. at 1366, 1360 n.1. 
128. 666 F. Supp. at 1366. Although the court in a subsequent proceeding dismissed 
the case, the dismissal was not based on the merits of the first amendment claim. Ameri-
can Baptist Churches II, 712 F. Supp. at 762. The court found that the plaintiffs lacked 
standing to assert the First Amendment claim, reasoning that the earlier decision only 
granted conditional standing to assert the first amendment claim. Id. In support of that 
conclusion, the court noted that the plaintiffs had since amended their complaint, and 
now requested exemption from prosecutions only under the old version of the statute. Id. 
at 761·62. The court accepted the defendants' argument that by virtue of Congress' 
amendment of the older criminal harboring and transporting statute with the enactment 
of the Immigration Reform and Control Act in 1986, there was now a significant likeli· 
hood that certain of the INS' prosecution goals would be changed; i.e., the INS now 
seemed less interested in prosecuting religious organizations, and more interested in 
prosecuting employers. Id. at 761 n.1. Therefore, the court reasoned, there was less likeli-
hood of a continuing wrong which would justify the granting of injunctive relief. Id. at 
762. The court's alternative ground for dismissal was that the plaintiffs had not made a 
prima facie showing of selective (harassing) prosecution. Id. at 762·63. 
129. 666 F. Supp. at 1364·66. 
130. Id. at 1364·65. 
16
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol20/iss1/7
1990] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 113 
that the impact of the facially neutral immigration statute on 
the sanctuary workers' free exercise right was substantial.13l As 
for the second prong, the court held that the government's inter-
ests in secure borders were compelling as a matter of law.132 
With regard to the third prong, the court found that the plain-
tiffs had alleged that the harm to their first amendment rights 
outweighed any harm to the government's interests that might 
result from an exemption from prosecution under the statute.133 
The court noted that the extent of such harm to governmental 
interests was a factual question incapable of proper resolution 
on a motion to dismiss,134 citing a 1984 Ninth Circuit case, Cal-
lahan v. Woods. l3Ci 
In Callahan, the court had observed that determination of 
the existence of a compelling governmental interest does not dis-
pose of the issue in favor of the government; rather, the "least 
restrictive means" inquiry is the critical third aspect of the free 
exercise analysis.13s The court in American Baptist Churches I 
employed the least restrictive means inquiry endorsed by Calla-
han in 1984.137 The court ordered further proceedings to con-
sider whether the INS' compelling objectives would be "mini-
131. Id. at 1365. 
132. American Baptist Churches I, 666 F. Supp. at 1365-66. The court concluded 
that "there exists a compelling governmental interest bearing a close proximity and ne-
cessity to the criminal harboring statute at issue here." Id. at 1366. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. 736 F.2d 1269, 1274-75. (9th Cir. 1984). In Callahan, a welfare applicant chal-
lenged a state requirement to provide a social security number, which the applicant be-
lieved was the "mark of the beast". Id. at 1271. The district court had held that the state 
had a compelling interest in administrative efficiency that outweighed the applicant's 
free exercise burden. Id. at 1272. The Ninth Circuit found that the district court had 
failed to consider whether the state's compelling interest would be substantially under-
mined by granting a religious exemption. Id. at 1275. The court termed this a "least 
restrictive menns" test, requiring a remand because it was a factual determination. [d. 
136. Id. at 1272 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 
374 U.S. 398 (1963». 
This is the same test used in the free speech and free association contexts. See, e.g., 
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (draft card burning statute's bur-
dening of free speech rights no more restrictive than necessary to protect compelling 
governmental purpose); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (statute requiring 
teachers to list associational memberships may be based on compelling purpose, but was 
not the "least drastic means" of achieving that purpose); White v. Davis, 13 Cal.3d 757, 
772 (1975) (covert surveillance of university classrooms allowable only if shown to be the 
least intrusive means of protecting compelling governmental interest). 
137. American Baptist Churches I, 666 F.Supp. at 1366. 
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mally impeded" by the granting of an exemption to the plaintiff 
religious organizations.138 The fact that the plaintiffs in those 
subsequent proceedings (American Baptist Churches II) were 
found to lack standing,139 was due to an amendment of the 
statute. HO 
C. OTHER SURVEILLANCE LITIGATION 
In Donohoe v. DulingHl the police carried on covert photo-
graphic surveillance of demonstrators' gatherings in various 10-
cations.142 Some of the meetings were held inside a church, but 
the police did not take photographs of those gatherings. Instead, 
they photographed demonstrators entering and leaving the 
church.143 
The plaintiff demonstrators alleged violations of their first 
amendment rights of speech and association, and of their right 
of privacy from unreasonable government intrusion.144 The 
Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to assert 
the alleged first amendment violations, because there was no tes-
timony as to any objective harm, deterrent or chilling effect due 
to the surveillance. HI! The court noted also that because the po-
lice did not actually place photographers inside the church, no 
first amendment rights were implicated.146 
In United States v. SCOpO,147 federal agents took surrepti-
138. Id. 
139. American Baptist Churches II, 712 F. Supp. at 762. 
140. Id. After passage of the Immigration Reform Act of 1986 the INS changed cer-
tain practices, which led the court in American Baptist Churches II to conclude that 
there was no longer a strong likelihood that such illegal practices would continue in the 
future. 756 F. Supp. at 762. See also supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text. 
141. 465 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1972) (political demonstrators lacked first amendment 
standing because they had not alleged any objective harm, restraint or chilling effect due 
to police surveillance of public meetings). 
142. Id. at 197. 
143. Id. at 198-99. 
144. Id. at 197. 
145. Donohoe, 465 F.2d at 199. 
146. Id. at 198. The fact that the church meetings were on private property was a 
factor that the police "properly" took into consideration in deciding not photograph in-
side the church. Although the court observed that the church meetings were also open to 
the public, the court did not hold that the police were protected by that fact. Id. 
147. 861 F.2d 339 (2nd Cir. 1988) (covert surveillance photos taken of suspected 
criminal while outside church not violative of free exercise clause). 
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tious photographs of a suspected criminal as he entered and ex-
ited a church while attending a funeral. 148 The defendant 
claimed that his first amendment rights were violated by the 
surveillance.H9 The Second Circuit recognized the potential chil-
ling effect on his exercise of religion, but held there was no first 
amendment violation. lII0 The court found that covert surveil-
lance photographs were reasonably related to the government's 
compelling interest in investigation of suspected criminals. un 
More importantly, the court found those means were not unduly 
broad and unnecessarily intrusive,lIi2 observing that the govern-
ment's covert photographs were not taken inside the church and 
did not record any religious ceremony.lIiS 
In White v. Davis,llS" undercover police agents allegedly con-
ducted routine covert surveillance of various university class-
rooms. llSlS The police had no probable cause to believe there was 
any criminal activity going on. llSB The plaintiffs alleged that the 
covert surveillance violated their first amendment rights of free-
dom of speech, assembly and privacy.llS7 The California supreme 
court held that such covert surveillance constituted a prima fa-
cie violation of first amendment rights, and reversed the lower 
court's granting of a demurrer.llS8 In a footnote, the court care-
fully explained its rejection of the defendant police department's 
contention that the semi-public nature of a classroom negated 
148. [d. at 347. The defendant was reputed to be a member of the Colombo crime 
family, and the photos were taken to show him mingling with other known members of 
the family. [d. 
149. [d. 
150. [d. at 347-348. 
151. Scopo, 861 F.2d at 348. 
152. [d. 
153. [d. 
154. 13 Ca1.3d 757, 120 Cal.Rptr 94, 533 P.2d 222 (1975) (students and faculty 
stated cause of action against police officers conducting covert surveillance of classrooms 
without warrants or probable cause to suspect criminal activity). 
155. 13 Cal.3d at 760. The complaint alleged that police officers, serving as "secret 
informers and undercover agents," registered as students at UCLA, attended classes and 
meetings of organizations, and maintained police dossiers containing their reports of 
what went on at those meetings. [d. at 762. 
156. [d. at 765. Because the case was an appeal from a demurrer, the court ruled 
"we must assume that the Los Angeles Police Department is conducting a regular, ongo-
ing covert surveillance operation of university classes and university-recognized organiza-
tions, and is compiling police dossiers on 'matters which pertain to no illegal activity or 
acts.' " [d. 
157. [d. at 762. 
158. [d. at 773. 
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any claim of "first amendment privacy.mll9 
D. THE FREE EXERCISE AND ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSES IN THE 
SURVEILLANCE CONTEXT 
The Supreme Court in Everson v. Board of Education,160 
stated that the government may not openly or secretly partici-
pate in church meetings and services.161 The Everson opinion 
not only discussed establishment clause concerns, but free exer-
cise concerns as well, speaking at length on the "interrelation of 
these complementary clauses".162 
This characterization of the two first amendment religion 
clauses as complementary raises not only the question of the re-
lationship between the two clauses,168 but more specifically 
whether an establishment clause analysis should be viewed as 
valuable by a court considering a free exercise claim. To answer 
159. White, 13 Cal.3d at 768 n.4. The court rejected the proposition that private 
individuals, once they had revealed their associations or beliefs to other individuals, con-
sequently lost their right to prevent the government from prying into those associations 
or beliefs. [d. 
160. 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (state statute providing for transportation of parochial school 
students did not violate the first amendment). 
161. [d. at 15-16. The Supreme Court in Euerson admonished courts that neither 
the Federal or state governments may: 
[d. 
influence a person to go to or to remain away from church 
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in 
any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or 
professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance 
or non-attendance .... Neither a state nor the Federal Gov-
ernment can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of 
any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. 
162. Euerson, 330 U.S. at 13-16. 
163. There are numerous cases that treat the two clauses together. See, e.g., Wiscon-
sin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220-21 (1972) (Amish qualified for exemption from compul-
sory school attendance law); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963) (denial of un-
employment benefits to claimant who refused to work on Saturday sabbath violates free 
exercise clause, while exemption from eligibility provisions would not violate establish-
ment clause); Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 
(4th Cir. 1985) (woman's Title VII employment discrimination suit against church 
barred because it would violate both religion clauses); Bender v. Williamsport Area 
School Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984) (accommodating school prayer club's right of 
"religious speech" by allowing meetings during school hours would violate establishment 
clause); Surinach v. Pesquera de Busquets, 604 F.2d 73 (1st Cir. 1979) (Puerto Rico's 
subpoenaing church school documents violated both clauses); New Life Baptist Church 
Academy v. East Longmeadow, 666 F. Supp. 293 (D. Mass. 1987) (statute requiring state 
approval of private school curriculum violated both clauses). 
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this question, it is necessary to examine how the Court has ana-
lyzed violations of these two clauses on other occasions. 
In Lemon u. Kurtzman/64 the Supreme Court articulated 
the traditional establishment clause test.161i The test includes 
three requirements: the challenged governmental practice must 
have a secular legislative purpose; its primary effect must 
neither advance nor inhibit religion; and it must not foster an 
excessive entanglement with religion.166 The Court observed that 
it was bound to apply strict scrutiny to prevent government in-
trusion into religious affairs.167 Since the Lemon decision, the 
Supreme Court has refined and elaborated upon the tests to be 
employed.168 In Larson u. Valente/59 the Court observed that 
the establishment clause was added to the first amendment in 
1791 in order to further safeguard the rights guaranteed by the 
free exercise clause.17o As the challenged governmental conduct 
was alleged to create preferences between religions, such a pref-
erence had the effect of creating disapproval of one religion and 
approval of another, which necessarily burdened free exercise 
rights. Because the alleged violation of the establishment clause 
necessarily affects free exercise rights, courts are required to ap-
ply the same strict scrutiny used in free exercise contexts. 171 The 
Supreme Court thus requires courts to apply the same level of 
scrutiny for a free exercise clause violation as for an establish-
ment clause violation. 
164. 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (statutes concerning payments to parochial schools fostered 
excessive entanglement with affairs of religious organizations). 
165. [d. at 612-613. 
166. [d. 
167. [d. at 614. 
168. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (Nativity scene included in city-sponsored Christmas display not violative of estab-
lishment clause); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 252 (1981) (income reporting statute 
creating denominational preferences violated establishment clause). 
169. 456 U.S. 228 (1981). 
170. Id. at 244-245. The Court observed further: "This constitutional prohibition of 
denominational preferences is inextricably connected with the continuing vitality of the 
Free Exercise Clause." [d. at 245. Continuing, the Court endorsed the view expressed by 
James Madison that religious rights must have the same protection as other civil rights. 
[d. 
171. [d. at 246. The Court specifically held that when the challenged government 
action creates a denominational preference, courts are directed to "apply strict scrutiny 
in adjudging its constitutionality." Id. The Court explained that the action must be in-
validated unless it is justified by "a compelling governmental interest [citation omitted) . 
. . . [and is) closely fitted to further that interest." Id. at 247. 
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IV. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit first found that the churches had stand-
ing to challenge the government's actions allegedly in violation 
of their first amendment rights, relying primarily on the plain-
tiffs' allegations of actual injury caused by the agents' actions. l72 
Notwithstanding those allegations of injury, the court dismissed 
the claim for damages on the basis of qualified immunity.l73 The 
court reasoned that it would not have been apparent to reasona-
ble INS officials that undercover electronic surveillance of 
church services without a warrant and without probable cause 
violated the churches' clearly established rights under the first 
amendment.m The court found "no support in the preexisting 
case law for the churches' contention that the unlawfulness of 
the conduct was apparent."l711 
The court in Presbyterian Church took note of the Supreme 
Court's statement in Everson v. Board of Educationl76 forbid-
ding the government from openly or secretly participating in the 
affairs of religious organizations, but accorded little weight to 
it,!77 As Everson involved state aid to parochial schools, the 
court in Presbyterian Church found it to be "an establishment 
clause case, not a free exercise case.IIl78 The court termed the 
language "dicta", and found it inapplicable to the case at bar.179 
The court disposed of the churches' fourth amendment 
claim by rejecting the precedential value of the two cases relied 
on by the plaintiffs, Katz v. United States l80 and Zurcher v. 
Stanford Daily.l8.1 The court found that those cases did not es-
tablish the law regarding covert surveillance of churches.182 The 
172. The Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. United States, 870 F.2d 518, 520-21 (9th 
Cir. 1989). 
173. Id. at 528. 
174. Id. at 527. 
175. Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 527. 
176. 330 U.S. at 16. 
177. Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 527. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. The Supreme Court in Everson held that the challenged statute did not 
violate the first amendment establishment clause. 330 U.S. at 18. 
180. 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (warrantless electronic surveillance of phone booth violated 
man's fourth amendment rights). 
181. 436 U.S. 547 (1978). See also supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text. 
182. Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 527. 
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court reasoned that Katz may establish that the fourth amend-
ment protects "reasonable expectations of privacy,"lS3 but that 
the case had no bearing on the issue of whether such a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy "attaches to church worship services 
open to the public."ls. 
The court distinguished Zurcher on factual grounds. lSI! The 
plaintiffs cited Zurcher for the proposition that the fourth 
amendment's requirements must be observed with "special 
stringency" when a person's first amendment rights are impli-
cated.ls6 They urged that when first amendment rights are im-
plicated, the fourth amendment requires that a search be con-
ducted with a warrant.lS7 The court in Presbyterian Church 
conceded as much, but again relied on the Katz dictum authored 
by concurring Justice Harlan. lss The court apparently reasoned 
that since there was no expectation of privacy in church services 
open to the public (as opposed to a private newspaper office not 
generally open to the public), the question of whether the fourth 
amendment's requirements were satisfied simply was not 
relevant. ISS 
Finally, the court noted that the finding of qualified immu-
nity for the individual agents raised the questions of mootness 
and standing to seek prospective relief. ISO The court reasoned 
that, while the churches had standing to seek damages on the 
first amendment issue, standing to seek prospective relief was 
another question entirely. lSI The basis for the court's reasoning 
was that a factual inquiry was necessary to determine the likeli-
183. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
184. Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 527. 
185. [d. Although there was little elaboration, the court in Presbyterian Church 
may have been referring to the fact that in Zurcher the police searched a private univer-
sity newspaper office, with warrants based on probable cause that criminal evidence was 
present. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 565. 
186. Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 527. 
187. See Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 565, where the Court observed, "the prior cases do no 
more than insist that the courts apply the warrant requirements with particular exacti-
tude when First Amendment interests would be endangered by the search." 
188. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan noted that prior 
cases required that the complainant have an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy 
that society recognizes as reasonable. [d. 
189. Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 527. 
190. [d. at 528. 
191. [d. at 523, 528. 
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hood that the churches would be subjected to the INS' covert 
surveillance in the future.192 Accordingly, the court remanded 
the case to the district court below for such a factual 
determination.19s 
V. CRITIQUE 
Had the court in Presbyterian Church (US.A.) v. United 
States l94 conducted a broader survey of pre-existing caselaw, it 
would have been better able to analyze the issue of qualified im-
munity of the defendant INS agents. Because there were no 
cases precisely on point (i.e., concerning the covert surveillance 
of churches by INS agents), the court essentially had two op-
tions. The first option, chosen by the court, consisted of finding 
the defendants qualifiedly immune because the prior caselaw did 
not expressly prohibit the covert surveillance of churches with-
out a warrant or probable cause to suspect criminal activity. The 
choice of this option effectively perpetuated immunity of INS 
agents from suit in like situations. If other courts follow the pre-
cedent of this narrow interpretation of Harlow, this grant of 
qualified immunity will be converted into perpetual immunity 
because it operates to preclude a contrary holding. m 
A second option would have been to broaden the court's 
survey of first amendment caselaw. Had the court done this, a 
more comprehensive examination of the relevant legal rules and 
factual contexts could have been accomplished. Existing caselaw, 
including both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court, 
strongly indicates that in a situation such as that of Presbyte-
rian Church, the plaintiffs' claims and the defendants' defenses 
could not be properly evaluated on a motion for summary 
judgment. 
For at least the past five years, the Ninth Circuit has been 
careful to scrupulously survey the state of the law whenever the 
192. [d. at 528-29. The court noted that because the standing and mootness issues 
had not been briefed by the parties, and because of the limited record on appeal, "we are 
unable to assess the likelihood that the INS will again engage in the kind of church 
surveillance challenged in this case." [d. at 529. 
193. [d. at 529. 
194. 870 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1989). 
195. See supra notes 88 and 100 and accompanying text. 
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affirmative defense of qualified immunity is raised on a particu-
lar issue.19o There are several areas in which a more comprehen-
sive investigation might have led the court to conclude that the 
government agents' qualified immunity defense should be re-
jected. As mandated by the Supreme Court in Anderson197 and 
Forsyth,198 and by the Ninth Circuit in Ostrander199 and 
Roth,200 the fact that the cases uncovered by such an investiga-
tion may lack the precise factual scenario present in Presbyte-
rian Church should not entitle a defendant to an automatic 
grant of qualified immunity. Both the Supreme Court and the 
Ninth Circuit have rejected strict factual similarity as a neces-
sary requisite to a rejection of qualified immunity.20l 
A. THE FIRST AMENDMENT "LEAST RESTRICTIVE MEANS" TEST 
The question of whether covert surveillance violates a per-
son's first amendment rights is essentially the same whatever 
the context: the purpose of the inquiry is to determine whether 
the surveillance has had a "chilling effect" on a plaintiff's first 
amendment rights.202 Because of the essential similarity among 
first amendment protections, reasonable INS agents should be 
charged with knowledge of the law in other first amendment 
contexts. For this reason, the court in Presbyterian Church 
should have broadened the scope of its survey, to include a re-
view of case law in the contexts of freedom of association, free-
dom of speech, and the right of privacy as it exists in the first 
amendment. 
Had the court conducted a broader review of first amend-
ment case law, it would have become apparent that the appro-
priate inquiry into the INS agents' conduct should have focused 
on whether their surveillance satisfied the "least restrictive 
196. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. 
197. 483 U.S.635, 640 (1987). 
198. 472 U.S. 511, 535 (1985). 
199. 851 F.2d 1212, 1217 (9th Cir. 1988). 
200. 856 F.2d 1401, 1408 (9th Cir. 1988). 
201. Ostrander, 851 F.2d at 1217 (citing Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640, and Forsyth, 
432 U.S. at 535); see also Roth, 856 F.2d at 1408. 
202. Donohoe v. Duling, 465 F.2d 196, 199 (4th Cir. 1972). See also White v. Davis, 
13 Cal. 3d 757, 771-72, 120 Cal.Rptr 94, 533 P.2d 222 (1975), for a discussion of federal 
and state court holdings concerning a variety of first amendment contexts. 
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means" component of first amendment analysis.203 Putting this 
conclusion into the context of a qualified immunity inquiry, the 
court would then have asked whether, in light of the pre-existing 
case law, a reasonable INS agent could have believed that his 
warrantless and groundless surveillance of church worship ser-
vices was even necessary (much less the "least restrictive 
means") in an investigation which had already garnered more 
than enough evidence to indict and convict the sanctuary 
workers. 
The holding in Callahan20' should have alerted the court in 
Presbyterian Church that as of 1984, the Ninth Circuit required 
a strong factual showing of compelling interest and least restric-
tive means, in order for a government entity to intrude on first 
amendment free exercise rights. Moreover, because the decision 
pre-dated the events of Presbyterian Church, the court should 
have charged the INS with constructive knowledge of the hold-
ing in Callahan.2Or> 
In light of the above analysis, it is distinctly possible that 
the court in Presbyterian Church erred in dismissing the dam-
ages claim against the individual INS agents. At the very least, 
in view of the holding in Callahan, the claim should have been 
allowed to proceed to trial on the merits to determine the fac-
tual question of whether the INS had a compelling need for that 
particular type of surveillance, which could not be served by any 
other less restrictive means. 
This conclusion is supported by the reasoning in Roth,206 
which recognized that the need for "particularized fact-specific 
balancing" of first amendment rights against governmental in-
terests did not require a grant of qualified immunity. In fact, the 
opposite is true. Precisely because of the need for such a factual 
inquiry, qualified immunity should not be granted on a motion 
for summary judgment.207 Moreover, the court in Presbyterian 
203. Callahan, 736 F.2d at 1272-73. 
204. [d. 
205. See supra text accompanying notes 67-70 and 84-86 for a discussion of the 
Ninth Circuit's approval of holding defendant government officials constructively aware 
of the judicial tests used to evaluate alleged constitutional violations. 
206. See supra text accompanying notes 101-103. 
207. [d. 
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Church could have found that the unnecessary surveillance con-
stituted "egregious behavior" that would, as a "foregone conclu-
sion", outweigh any benefit to the INS.208 
B. THE FIRST AND FOURTH AMENDMENTS IN THE CRIMINAL 
CONTEXT 
The legal challenges in Presbyterian Church concerned the 
relationship between the first and fourth amendments. The 
question therefore arises whether the potential for a first amend-
ment violation required the INS agents to comply with the re-
quirements of the fourth amendment; i.e., whether they were re-
quired to obtain a warrant, or a warrant substitute, before 
covertly invading the worship services of the church. 
The Ninth Circuit in Presbyterian Church and Aguilar con-
cluded that, based on the Supreme Court holdings in Katz and 
Zurcher, the INS did not have to comply with the warrant re-
quirement of the fourth amendment.209 Because the analysis in 
Aguilar was based on a factual situation in which the govern-
ment was investigating suspected criminal activities, there seems 
to be no basis upon which to argue with that court's holding that 
surveillance of clandestine meetings held to discuss smuggling, 
transporting and harboring of illegal aliens did not violate the 
first amendment, even when the fourth amendment's strictest 
criteria were not met. 
But the holding in Presbyterian Church is not safe from at-
tack. Because of the lack of probable cause to suspect criminal 
activity in the worship services and Bible study classes, the "in-
vited informer" rationale used by the court in Aguilar was not 
available to the court in Presbyterian Church.210 Moreover, the 
"reasonable expectation of privacy" doctrine, as used in Katz 
and its progeny, is similarly unavailable to the court in Presby-
terian Church. This doctrine is an element of a criminal de-
fense, but the court in Presbyterian Church invoked the doc-
trine as supportive of the government defendants' position in a 
208. See Roth, 856 F.2d at 1408, citing Benson, 786 F.2d at 276 n. 18. 
209. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text. 
210. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
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civil lawsuit.211 Taken to its logical limits, the court's position 
would support covert governmental surveillance of all public 
places, for whatever reasons, regardless of whether the govern-
ment had probable cause to suspect criminal activity.212 
It is difficult to comprehend th~ court's logic that INS 
agents could justifiably rely on the "reasonable expectation of 
privacy" doctrine espoused in Katz to avoid having to take cog-
nizance of the clear holding in Zurcher.213 Absent an excuse for 
ignoring the unequivocal holding in Zurcher that the implication 
of first amendment rights mandates that government officials 
comply with the fourth amendment warrant requirement, the 
INS agents should have been charged with constructive knowl-
edge of that requirement. By this reasoning, they were not enti-
tled to a finding of qualified immunity from suit. 
C. THE FIRST AMENDMENT RELIGION CLAUSES 
The court's characterization of Everson as an establishment 
clause case provided the court with a basis for not according any 
weight to the "dicta" concerning the free exercise clause.214 The 
opinion does not indicate whether the court considered any 
post-Everson cases concerning the relationship between the two 
religion clauses.m Had the court conducted such a survey, it 
could have reasonably concluded that judicial interpretations of 
both clauses offer valuable guidance on the level of judicial scru-
tiny applied to challenged governmental actions that implicate 
first amendment religious rights. 216 
Although the tests for evaluating alleged violations for the 
two religion clauses are stated in different terms, they each in-
volve weighing a religious interest and a governmental interest 
in the context of a challenged governmental action. On one 
hand, there is the burden on the religious interest (whether an 
"establishment" or an "exercise" of religion) caused by the chal-
lenged action. And on the other, there is the impediment to a 
211. Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 527, citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 516. 
212. See White, 13 Ca1.3d at 766, for a discussion of cases on this point. 
213. See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
214. See supra text accompanying notes 176-79. 
215. Id. 
216. See supra notes 163-71 and accompanying text. 
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compelling governmental interest caused by suspending or modi-
fying the challenged action. Both establishment and free exer-
cise cases have required that the challenged governmental action 
be closely fitted to the governmental interest.217 
A survey of case law on the complementary relationship be-
tween the two religion clauses would have provided the court in 
Presbyterian Church with a foundation upon which to find the 
INS agents constructively aware of the traditional strict scrutiny 
that courts apply to alleged violations of religious rights.218 This 
long tradition of deference toward religious rights, coupled with 
Everson's express warning that the government may not secretly 
participate in the activities of churches,219 should have ade-
quately put the INS agents on notice that their unnecessary sur-
veillance of church services and classes violated the first amend-
ment. Courts may split hairs over whether such an express 
warning was "dicta", but in the context of a qualified immunity 
analysis, a reasonable INS agent's understanding of that warn-
ing would not be affected by such fine judicial distinctions. 
D. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY VERSUS "PERPETUAL" IMMUNITY 
There are two troubling aspects of the court's finding of 
qualified immunity for the defendants. The first concerns the 
immediate parties to the lawsuit. Because the court was deciding 
the question of immunity from suit, the court never reached the 
merits of the first amendment damages claim. Not only were the 
plaintiff churches effectively shut out of court on their damages 
claim, but there was a strong indication that because of the 
court's finding of qualified immunity, the lower court on remand 
might find the case moot, or find that the churches no longer 
217. Compare Larson, 228 U.S. at 247 (rules challenged as violative of establish-
ment clause must be "closely fitted" to compelling governmental interest) with Calla-
han, 736 F.2d at 1274 (regulation challenged as violative of free exercise clause found 
"essential" to achieve underlying governmental value) and American Baptist Church 1, 
666 F. Supp. at 1366 (criminal harboring statute challenged as violative of free exercise 
clause found to bear "close proximity and necessity" to compelling interest in control of 
nation's borders). 
218. See supra text accompanying notes 163-71 for a discussion of cases dealing 
with the two religion' clauses. See also supra text accompanying notes 67-70 and 84-86 
for a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's approval of holding defendant government officials 
constructively aware of the tests used to evaluate alleged constitutional violations. 
219. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
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have standing to seek prospective relief. 
The second troubling aspect of the holding in Presbyterian 
Church concerns a broader policy question. The court's holding 
is in effect a grant of perpetual immunity. There is little to stop 
INS agents in the future from doing precisely the same sort of 
thing, without fear of prosecution. Since there has apparently 
never been a case holding INS agents liable for a damages claim 
for covert surveillance of churches, the government agents can 
continue to claim that they are unaware of the illegality of their 
actions. This is precisely the sort of situation warned against in 
Hobson. 22o 
In view of the broad policy implications of the holding in 
Presbyterian Church, it seems imperative to recall the purpose 
of the qualified immunity doctrine as defined by the Supreme 
Court in Harlow. Not only must a finding of qualified immunity 
be based on a search for clearly established law, but it must also 
be in keeping with the purpose of the doctrine. 
In Harlow, the Supreme Court was concerned with protect-
ing innocent public officials from insubstantial lawsuits.221 The 
situation in Presbyterian Church would appear to fall outside 
the perimeters of that concern. The officials were hardly "inno-
cent", since they were conducting surveillance that was demon-
strably unnecessary. And the magnitude of the churches' alleged 
injuries, as conceded by the court itself,m was certainly not "in-
substantial" as that term was used in Harlow. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The court in Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. United 
States228 should have rejected the INS agents' qualified immu-
nity defense, and allowed the plaintiff churches' claim for mone-
220. 737 F.2d 1, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (to require a prior Supreme Court case exactly 
on point would "actually reward the Government for inventing and pursuing ever more 
egregious conduct. Indeed, there never could be such a ruling from the Court, because 
Harlow would always immunize the Government actors"). See also supra notes 88·92 
and accompanying text. 
221. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814. 
222. Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 523. 
223. 870 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1989). 
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tary damages to remain in the case. Had the court conducted 
the type of broad survey of prior caselaw mandated by other 
Ninth Circuit opinions, it would have become apparent to the 
court that the fundamental rights at issue in this case could not 
be adequately protected at the summary judgment stage. 
Neither the nature of the defendants' alleged misconduct, 
nor the magnitude of the injuries alleged, fell within the purview 
of the modern qualified immunity doctrine articulated by 
Harlow. The plaintiff churches should have been allowed the op-
portunity to prove their claims at trial. 
Michael E. Banister* 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1991. 
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